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PREAMBLE

"May you live in interesting times" is a well-known ancient Chinese
curse. Although not usually a superstitious lot, many securities lawyers
believe they are now laboring under that imprecation. Their bedevilment
stems from a combination of: (1) the Supreme Court's proclamation of a
new uniform statute of limitations for securities fraud actions in the
landmark case of Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson
(Lamp]);1 (2) subsequent congressional action that negated the retroactive application of that new limitary period by adding section 27A to the
Securities Exchange Act,2 and now; (3) the controversy over whether
that remedial legislation can constitutionally prohibit the retroactive application of the period of limitation prescribed by Lampf to pending
cases.
Having just concluded a lengthy writing on the new limitary period
with an eleventh-hour postscript describing the passage of the congressional mandate for prospective application of the new limitary period,
this author shares the vexation of his colleagues.3 While subsequent decisions on the issue were both expected and welcomed, especially at the
trial level, few could have foretold that the titanic struggle, so soon
ended, was but the precursor to yet another cataclysm. This article will
address the latest emerging struggle over the proper statute of limitations
for securities fraud actions.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.' to vacate and remand the decree of the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in light of the new section 27A, which prohibits the
retroactive application of the rule first pronounced in Lampf, is critical to
this writing. This article shall collect and analyze the history and legislative purpose of the new statute; parse the lower court decisions that have
upheld it or declared it unconstitutional; discuss the appellate scenarios
now subjudice; and propose an outcome that does justice to the litigants
1. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). See also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. See Anthony M. Sabino, The New Uniform Statute of Limitationsfor FederalSecurities
FraudActions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, and a Callfor Reform, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 485 (1992) for a
discussion of the cases addressing the proper statute of limitations for securities fraud actions implied under § 10b-5.
4. 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. granted andjudgment vacated sub nom., Dennier v.
Trippet, 112 S. Ct. 1658, and amended by 112 S. Ct. 1757 (1992).
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whose cases hang in the balance on this issue, while contemporaneously
having proper regard for the constitutional questions raised therein.
II.

RULE 1OB-5 AND ITS LIMrrATIONS: A QUICK REVIEW

It is now well established that although section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule 10b-5 6 provide the "ultimate weapons" of securities anti-fraud enforcement and litigation, they lack a
defined statute of limitations. For decades, an internecine conflict has
raged among the circuits, each borrowing diverse statutes of limitations
from its forum state. This inequitable and virtually unworkable crazyquilt pattern finally met its end in Lampf, in which the Supreme Court
ruled that "[1]itigation instituted pursuant to [section] 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 therefore must be commenced within one year after the discovery
of facts constituting the violation and within three years after such
violation." 7
Although the Lampf rule was welcomed, its immediate repercussions were not. Because Lampf dismissed section 10(b) claims actually
before the courts as untimely under the new one-year/three-year period,
and because of its linkage to James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
(Beam),' securities fraud plaintiffs who had timely filed their lawsuits
under then-existing law found the future of their actions endangered by
the retroactive application of the new, shorter limitary period prescribed
in Lampf. For instance, in Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells,9 the
Eighth Circuit remanded a securities fraud case to the district court after
being "compelled to apply [Lampf] retroactively."' 10 The opinion noted
that the Supreme Court applied Lampf retroactively "without discussion
or analysis."1 " Parenthetically, the Eighth Circuit observed that while
Justice Souter's plurality opinion in Beam was joined only by one other
member of the Court, the concurrences of four of the remaining Justices
lent support to the retroactive application of Lampf.12
In the waning days of June 1991, it became apparent that an untold
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
7. Lampf, 111 S.Ct. at 2782.
8. 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991) (Beam). The Court handed down Beam and Lampf on the same
day. Beam addressed a state tax law question, and arguably advocated its own retroactive application to civil rulings.
9. 942 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The Eight Circuit panel included Senior Circuit
Judge Peck of the Sixth Circuit.
10. Id. at 498.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 498 n.l.
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number of securities fraud lawsuits were in immediate jeopardy of being
dismissed as untimely. The supposed mandate from the Supreme Court
to apply the new one-year/three-year limitary rule retroactively to pending cases could mean dismissal on that ground alone for any case filed in
reliance on a longer, pre-Lampf period of limitation, regardless of the
merits of the case. Congress naturally felt compelled to avoid at all costs
the prospect of the dismissal of suits filed by legitimate plaintiffs under
section 10(b). Accordingly, the legislative branch sprang into action to
absorb the aftershocks felt in the wake of Lampf.
III. THE NEW SECTION 27A-A STATUTORY BAR TO THE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF LAMPF

At the urging of the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and other proponents, 13 and after much debate,' 4 Congress responded to the outcry against the draconian effects of Lampf by
promulgating the new section 27A. The statute provides as follows:
SEC. 27A(a) EFFECT ON PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION.-The
limitation period for any private civil action implied under section
10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall
be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June
19, 1991.
(b) EFFECT ON DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION.-Any
private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that
was commenced on or before June 19,1991(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19,
1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including
principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed prior to June 19,
1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff 1not
5 later than
60 days after the date of enactment of this section.
The passage of section 27A evinced the will of Congress to prevent any
potential damage caused by the retroactive application of Lampf. This
revision to the 1934 Act restores the applicable limitary periods to lawsuits commenced pre-Lampf, and permits plaintiffs to reinstate anti-fraud
13. See SEC ReiteratesSupportfor Extending Limitations Periodfor Private Lawsuits, [1990-

1991 Transfer Binder] 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1433 (Oct. 4, 1991).
14. Id.at 1434.
15. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2387 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78aa-1).
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actions dismissed on the basis of Lampf.1 6 Given the subsequent
firestorm of controversy over the constitutionality of section 27A, an indepth examination of the legislative history of that provision is in order.
A.

The Genesis of Section 27A

Even before it addressed the issue of Lampf's retroactivity, Congress was subjected to a barrage of requests to rework the entire limitary
scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in Lampf. In hearings before the
Senate, SEC Chairman Richard Breeden endorsed a two-years-from discovery/five-years-after-violation statute of limitations for causes of action
implied under section 10(b). Citing the fact that the intrinsic nature of
securities fraud makes detection difficult, and indeed most likely only after the fraud has collapsed, Chairman Breeden faulted Lampf for
promulgating an "unrealistically short" limitary period that would harm
the viability of the private lawsuits so essential to the anti-fraud statute's
enforcement function."
Acting on Commissioner Breeden's suggestion, Senators Bryan and
Riegle introduced S. 1533 to the Senate Securities Subcommittee."
Called "The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991," the bill would
have added a new section at the end of the codification of the Securities
Exchange Act. 9 The proposed statute provided that "any private right
of action arising from a violation of [the 1934] Act" would be governed
by a two-years-from discovery/five-years-from-the violation limitary
rule.2" This statutory amendment would have also eliminated the retroactive application of Lampf and permitted lawsuits then pending to be
decided by its two-year/five-year limitary period. Senator Bryan added
that his remedial legislation was based upon the amicus brief filed by the
SEC in Lampf, and that all causes of action implied under the federal
securities laws would fall within the penumbra of the new two-year/fiveyear rule. 1
16. Id.
17. Breeden EndorsesBill to Reverse Decision on § 10(b) Limitations Period,[1990-1991 Transfer Binder] 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1141 (July 23, 1991) [hereinafter Breeden Endorses Bill.
18. Senator Riegle, chairman of the full Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, cosponsored the proposed measure.
19. S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See 137 CONG. Rnc. S10,675-76 (daily ed. July 23,
1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
20. 137 CONG. REc. S10,691 (daily ed. July 23, 1991) (comments of Sen. Bryan).
21. Breeden Endorses Bill, supra note 17, at 1141.
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If enacted, the new provision would apply to any proceeding pending on or commenced after June 19, 1991.22 Additionally, the proposed
amendment explicitly commanded that any cause of action (1) dismissed
as time-barred after June 19, 1991, (2) which would have been timely
filed under applicable law the day before Lampf was decided, and
(3) which would have been timely under the new two-year/five-year statutory rule, could be reified within 60 days of the date of passage of the
amendment.2 3
When S. 1533 was introduced,2 4 Senator Bryan found it hard to determine "exactly [which plaintiffs would] be affected" by Lampf 25 Concerned for defendants and plaintiffs alike, he continued:
Of course, the securities industry needs to be protected as well. An
unlimited time limit for filing section 10 suits would expose securities
firms to unreasonable and unpredictable liabilities. [This amendment]
recognizes the
concerns of both the securities industry and the individ26
ual investor.
Chairman Breeden "strongly endorsed the measure, saying that lawsuits brought by individuals, and not his agency, 'performed a critical
role in preserving the integrity of our securities market.' "27 He added
that "uncovering sophisticated securities fraud was difficult and timeconsuming," and suggested that had the Lampf rule been in effect at the
time, "about 'one-half of the case against Drexel Burnham, a large part
of the Equity Funding case[,] and all of the case against E.F. Hutton for
check-kiting would have been barred.' "28
Mr. Breeden also noted that applied retroactively, the one-year/
three-year limitary period could threaten shareholder suits against the
Bank of Commerce and Credit International and Salomon Brothers.2 9
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 137 CONG. REC. S10,675-76 (daily ed. July 23, 1991).
25. Id. at SI0,691.
26. Id. Senator Bryan also offered the substance of S. 1533 as an amendment to the Senate
Banking Committee's comprehensive banking reform bill. Representative Markey, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, introduced the House of Representatives' counterpart to the Bryan measure. Senate Bank
Reform Bill Would Reverse Decision On § 10(b) Limitations Period, 23 FED. SEC. & CORP. DEV.
1291 (1991). The Markey proposal went even further, allowing plaintiffs "to bring suits within
either five years of the alleged violation or three years from the time the alleged violation was discovered." Id
27. Leslie Wayne, Breeden Backs Investors on Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1991, at 10
[hereinafter Breeden Backs Investors].
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Notably, it was reported separately that both the seized insurer, Executive Life of California, and imprisoned junk bond king Michael Milken
had begun to seek dismissals in their cases based on the holding in
Lampf Chairman Breeden has continued to lend strong support to a
statutory two-year/five-year limitary period, as evidenced by his comments at public forums.3 °
Congress' motivation did not change significantly when the Bryan
proposal became part of S. 543, the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance
Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991. 31 Primarily, Congress'
goal remained to allow pre-Lampf securities fraud cases "to be able to
proceed and not be cut off by [Lampf's new] statute of limitations."3 2
Admittedly, the lawmakers knew they would have to revisit the issue to
debate a statutory extension of the new one-year/three-year rule.3 3 However, because Lampf would have resulted in the dismissal of cases if left
undisturbed, expediency demanded that Congress act immediately and
return to the issue of limitary period another day.34
On December 19, 1991, President Bush signed the 1991 banking reform bill into law, thereby statutorily eradicating the retroactive effect of
Lampf 35 As its preamble announces, the law's legislative history is composed of the Senate Report, the House Report, and the House Conference Report.36 In this context, the individual legislative history of
section 27A is quite remarkable, primarily because of its absence. The
House Report3' obviously devotes much of its text to monetary relief for
the Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF"). Remarkably however, the report
never mentions the reason for enacting section 27A, even in the sectionby-section analysis, where an odd gap looms inexplicably where the dis38
cussion should appear.
30. Breeden Urges Changes to Limit Baseless Securities Allegations, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1524 (Oct. 18, 1991) (reiterating support for S.1533 in speech delivered before Corporate
Counsel Inst. on Oct. 16, 1991).
31. 137 CONG. Rac. S17,305 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (comments of Sen. Riegle).
32. Id.at § 17,307.
33. Id. (comments of Sen. Domenici).
34. Id. at S17,315 (comments of Sen. Riegle). It was confirmed that the proposed amendment
was "not intended to apply to or in any way affect the parties or the claims in the Lampf decision
itself." Id. at S17,383 (comments of Sen. Garn).
35. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2387 (codified at 15 U.S.C.

§ 78aa-1).
36. H.R. REp. No. 102-330, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1901.
37. Id. at 1901-26.
38. Id. at 1960.
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The abridged House Conference Report39 offers one possible explanation for the apparent omission of the history of section 27A. This report notes that House and Senate conferees "met for two days under a
stringent deadline" to consider legislation to fund the BIF. By motion,
the full House instructed its representatives to consider only issues within
the scope of the House's FDIC bill, and not the "more voluminous" Senate proposal. "[A]ll agreed that in the short time available for forging
this compromise, recapitalizing the BIF took top priority."'
The urgency of the conference may thus explain the failure to mention section
27A in the legislative history of the BIF.
In sum, section 27A offers nothing in the way of true legislative history, a defect that the subsequent discussion shall show to be most telling. Rather, one must look to the Congressional Record and other
public statements of lawmakers to determine its origins. The salient
point is that while the legislators cited specific examples of notorious securities fraud cases that would go unpunished if Lampf were applied
retroactively, Congress still intended to (and did) affect only a general,
loosely defined set of litigants in section 10(b) cases. The high profile
prosecutions were named only as handy exemplars.
B. Retroactivity Denied
The negation by section 27A of the retroactive effect of Lampf
seemed to take a firm hold in the wake of the passage of the FDIC Act.
For instance, the district judges of the Second Circuit, the "Mother
Court" of federal securities law,4 turned away attempts to apply the new
one-year/three-year rule retroactively and relied without hesitation on
pre-Lampflimitary periods borrowed from the forum states' statutes of
limitation to decide pending or refiled cases.42
In Mekhjian v. Wollin,4 3 District Judge Connor focused on the fact
that the plaintiffs were residents of New Jersey, a forum in which the
39. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-407, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1964.
40. Id.
41. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
42. Alfadda v. Fenn, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCi) 96,625 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 1992) (McKenna, J.); Ahmed v. Trupin, 781 F. Supp. 1017, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Sweet,
J.); Cf. Lewis v. Hermann, 775 F. Supp. 1137, 1143-46 (N.D. Il. 1991). In Lewis, District Judge
Aspen bypassed Lampfand decreed that the retroactivity issue had been resolved by Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991), in which the
Seventh Circuit imposed a one-year/three-year limitary rule.
43. 782 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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one-year/three-year limitary period had long been in force.' Ruling on
various motions to dismiss, the trial court noted that the new section 27A
precluded the retroactive application of the Lampf rule.45 Nonetheless,
since the statute now decreed that then-existing securities fraud actions
should be governed by the pre-Lampf limitation periods of the relevant
forum, Judge Connor borrowed the one-year/three-year rule that prevailed in the plaintiffs' home state before Lampf was decided.' Having
thus won the battle only to lose the war, the plaintiffs saw their actions
dismissed.4 7
Observers initially believed that such cogent logic as Judge Connor's
would rule the day. However, that thought quickly perished, as the viability of section 27A was suddenly brought under the inquisition of other,
more skeptical judges.
C. The New Constitutional Challenge
On the basis of such opinions as Judge Connor's, one would think
that the new uniform statute of limitations would be well settled and its
application restricted to prospective use, even under section 27A. However, times are much too interesting for such a pat result, and constitutional challenges to the remedial legislation soon arose.
TGX Corp. v. Simmons (TGX)4 8 constituted one of the first successful challenges to section 27A. In that decision, District Judge Peter Beer
flatly declared that section 27A was unconstitutional because it violated
44. Id. at 885 (citing In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 849 (1988)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. See also Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,556, at 96,563 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1992) (Connor, J.) ("By
enacting Section 27A limiting Lampf's retroactivity, Congress now requires this Court to conduct an
analysis of the statute of limitations applicable to each plaintiff."). Judge Connor also held that
principles of equitable tolling do not apply here. Mekhjian, 782 F. Supp. at 886; Borden, Inc., [19911992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,562.
Judge Connor commented succinctly that the statute of limitations for § 10(b) "has both
evolved and regressed" as a result of Lampf and the subsequent passage of section 27A. Mekhjian,
782 F. Supp. at 884. He added that "Congress has effectively turned back the clock" on securities
fraud actions that were pending before the Supreme Court decided Lampf Id. at 885. Accord Department of Economic. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1992) (calling for a "straightforward application" of section 27A). See also Ades
v. Deloitte & Touche, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,469 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
2, 1992); Schick v. Ernst & Young, 141 F.R.D. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In Schick, District Judge Sweet
noted in dicta that section 27A "effectively bars the retroactive application of Lampf." Id. at 24 n.2.
48. 786 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. La. 1992).
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"established separation of powers principles."' 49 The trial judge based his
separation of powers analysis on "[t]wo related constitutional principles."' 50 The first principle originated in United States v. Klein," in
which the Supreme Court held that while Congress can amend or repeal
any law, it cannot "prescribe a rule for a decision of a cause in a particular way" where "no new circumstances have been created by legislation."52 Judge Beer admitted that section 27A did not contravene this
initial precept,53 and found that Congress changed the law by enacting
section 27(A). Therefore, Congress had not contravened the principles
of separation of powers established by Klein and its progeny. The judge
that found before section 27(A) was enacted, all section 10(b) claims
were properly subject to the limitations period announced in Lampf and
made to apply retroactively by Beam. Section 27(A) then changed the
law by limiting Lampf only to prospective application.5 4 Judge Beer further suggested that Lampf did not change the law, but instead merely
clarified "what the law has always been."15 5 Thus, Judge Beer asserted
that through Beam, Lampf simply found the law where it was.
However, the court found that section 27A changed the established
rule and that such a function was clearly an unconstitutional exercise of
the Congress' power to make new law.56 It was because of the second
Klein principle that the new statute failed to pass constitutional scrutiny.
Judge Beer relied extensively on the "selective retroactivity" discussion
in Beam." The court rationalized its inquiry by maintaining that
"[o]nce a court finds that a congressional enactment has changed the
law, the court must then review the enactment itself, to assure that its
substance does not constitute an impermissible legislative encroachment
on the judicial power."5 " In short, the TGX court unquestioningly applied the full force of Justice Souter's plurality opinion in Beam to the
Lampf context, and held that "section 27A effect[ed] the selective prospectivity constitutionally proscribed in Beam."5 9 On this basis, the court
49. Id. at 591 n.4. As a result of this decision, the court declined to address the due process
aspect of the statute's constitutionality.
50. Id. at 591.
51. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
52. Id at 146-47 (followed by Seattle Audobon Soe'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 11l S. Ct. 2886 (1991); TGX Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 591).
53. TGX Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 592.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Id. at 594.
57. Id. at 592-93.
58. Id. at 592 n.5.
59. Id at 594.
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had no choice but to find section 27A unconstitutional. 6
Days after TGX was decided, District Judge Lewis T. Babcock of
Colorado ruled in two separate opinions issued on the same day that the
new limitary statute was unconstitutional. In Bank of Denver v. Southeastern CapitalGroup, Inc.,61 certain defendants had previously obtained
a dismissal of the plaintiff's section 10(b) claims on the basis of Lampf.
Pursuant to section 27A, the plaintiffs moved to reinstate their section
10(b) claims. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions to reinstate, and
asserted that because of Beam, "Lampf applied retroactively to all pending [section] 10(b) cases."' 61 In this context, Judge Babcock cast the new
statute in an unforgiving light, asserting that section 27A carves out a
limited class of pending federal actions for special treatment.
"[Although] cases filed after the Lampf decision are subject to the oneand-three... rule, cases pending on June 19, 1991 return to the precedent that applied in each jurisdiction before Lampf. '63 Not surprisingly,
the court then found section 27A unconstitutional."
Central to Judge Babcock's separation of powers analysis was his
quotation of the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services.6" In Nixon, the Supreme Court held that the proper
inquiry to determine whether an act disrupts the proper balance between
the branches focuses on the extent to which the act prevents a branch
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where
the potential for disruption is present must a federal court determine
whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress' constitutional authority. 6
The court remonstrated that under our tripartite system of checks
and balances, the "constitutional means" available to Congress to alter
judicial interpretation of a law is simple: "[I]t can repeal or amend the
law. Congress can even require the courts to apply such changes retroactively" and thereby indirectly affect the outcome of pending litigation.67
Judge Babcock acknowledged that a federal court should invalidate
a duly enacted statute "only for the most compelling constitutional reasons." Still though, the court was convinced that "Congress ha[d]
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
789 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992).
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1095 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443).
Id. at 1096.
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crossed the line into the exclusive province of the judiciary" by enacting
section 27A.6" The court stated the essence of the lawmakers' intrusion
into the judicial realm as follows:
Congress did not retroactively amend the section to state an express
limitations period. Rather, Congress selected a discrete category of
federal cases, those pending on June 19, 1991, and directed federal
courts hearing these cases to ignore the Supreme Court's binding interpretation of [section] 10(b) set out in Lampf. Congress thus effectively
acted as a 'super-appellate court,' overturning
Lampf without replac69
ing that decision with any new law.
The court then buttressed its holding with the additional finding that
section 27A is unconstitutional under general principles of separation of
power. "It is beyond debate that the quintessential constitutional attribute of the judiciary is the power to interpret the laws. Section [27A]
impermissibly encroaches on this function by directing federal courts to
ignore the Supreme Court's decision in some cases and to apply Lampf in
others."7 o
Finally, the court concluded its analysis with a statement tantamount to a rebuke of the Congress. Once again pointing to the legislators' power to amend or repeal a law if they are displeased with the
judiciary's interpretation of it, Judge Babcock chided that "Congress
could have written an express statute of limitation and repose into [section] 10(b) and applied the amendment retroactively. ' 71
Without question, the most exhaustive rejection of section 27A on
constitutional grounds appears in In re Brichard Securities Litigation
(Brichard).7 2 Price Waterhouse, the defendant accounting firm, opposed
the plaintiffs' motion to reinstate their securities fraud actions.7 3 Judge
Charles Legge voided section 27A as unconstitutional on the grounds
that it violated separation of powers principles. In so holding, Judge
Legge concluded that section 27A impermissibly attempted to direct decisions in particular cases.74 The Attorney General and the SEC filed a
68. Id.at 1097 (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.at 1097-98.
71. I at 1098; see also Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. 1992). Because
"Congress does not have the power to upset final judgments," Judge Babcock refused to reinstate

Johnston's securities fraud claims pursuant to section 27A on the ground that a final judgment had
been entered in their case more than a month before § 27A was enacted. Id at 1100.
72. 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
73. Id.at 1100.
74. Id.Because it intended to declare section 27A unconstitutional, the court notified the
United States Attorney General of the pendency of the dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a)
(1988).
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statement of interest and a brief in support of plaintiffs, which the court
considered."
Judge Legge defined the basic issue before the court as "whether
Congress [had] exceeded its authority under Article I" and "intrude[d]
into powers reserved to the judiciary under Article III."76 The court
acknowledged Supreme Court precedent for the propositions that first,
Congress may permissibly enact retroactive legislation if the application
of that legislation is justified by "'a rational legislative purpose,' "'Iand
second, that Congress may enact legislation affecting pending cases.7 8
However, noted the court, "[b]oth of these principles presuppose a substantive or procedural change in law made by Congress."7 9 The court
found that in this case, Congress had impermissibly attempted to prevent
the application of Lampf to existing cases.8 " Judge Legge thus opined
that section 27A enacted neither any underlying substantive law nor a
statute of limitations for section 10(b) cases. Rather, the statute left
Lampf untouched.
The court then declared the statute unconstitutional as a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine because it "improperly direct[ed] a result in pending cases, and reverse[d] final judgments of the federal
courts."8 Moreover, suggested the court, by altering the rule from
Beam, section 27A intrudes on the Supreme Court's authority as the "fi' 82
nal expounder of the Constitution.
Judge Legge devoted the majority of his opinion to state what he
believed section 27A is not. He contended that it is not a statute of limitations for section 10(b), and that it does not change an existing limitary
period. Instead, he asserted that its enactment merely prevents (and was
merely intended to prevent) the retroactive application of Lampf 83 The
court indicated that if Congress had promulgated a true statute of limitations for anti-fraud actions and "had commanded that the new statute
75. In re BrichardSe. Litig., 788 F. Supp. at 1100.
76. Id. at 1102.
77. Id. (quoting United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64 (1989)).
78. Id. (quoting United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1104 (admitting that since "the circuits were not in agreement" on the limitary period
for § 10(b) at the time, "it could be argued that [§] 27A(a) does not direct the outcome of that
specific group of cases.").
81. Id. at 1103.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1103-04.
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was to apply retroactively," such a law would pass constitutional muster." Nonetheless, held the court, it was impermissible for Congress to
bar the application of a specific decision."5 This intrusion on the adjudicative function 6 is analogous to the issue in Klein 17 because it "directs a
rule of decision."8 8
In addition to pointing out the textual infirmities of section 27A, the
Brichardcourt characterized the statute's legislative history as darkening
an already looming cloud of unconstitutionality.8 9 Reviewing the recorded floor debates preceding the statute's passage, Judge Legge found
that the lawmakers' comments clearly supported the holding that the
new law was specifically directed to change the outcome of certain court
proceedings, thereby contravening the separation of powers doctrine. 90
The court opined that although Congress was anxious to avoid what it
perceived as an "undesirable outcome in particular cases," it was nevertheless reluctant to enact a statute of limitations different from the one
set forth in Lampf 91 "As in Klein, the statute's 'great and controlling
purpose' was to direct the outcome in specific cases without changing the
governing law." 92
Having thus declared section 27A(a) unconstitutional, the Brichard
opinion then pronounced that subsection (b) was also unconstitutional.
After applying the analysis presented above to subsection (b), Judge
Legge found that this portion of the statute represented a classic attempt
by Congress to compel a particular result in a specified group of cases
without changing the underlying law. 93
This accusation, if true, raised the additional problem of whether
section 27A(b) impermissibly directs courts to reverse final judgments. 94
Thus, said the district judge, "even if [the] court were to find that section
27A changed the law announced in Lampf, it would be compelled to find
subsection (b) otherwise unconstitutional since a change in law cannot
84. Id. at 1104 n.5.
85. Id at 1104. The court noted that the impermissible intrusion in this case resulted from the
legislative directive not to follow Lampf, not from the passage of some alternative rule. Id.
86. Id
87. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1871).
88. In re BrichardSec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. at 1104.
89. Id. at 1105.
90. Id at 1105-06.
91. Id. at 1106.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. Id
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affect final judgments of courts." 95 The court grounded this holding on
two basic legal arguments. First, section 27A(b), as an act of discretion
of one branch of government over a declaration by the judiciary,
amounts to an advisory opinion, which is not "not within the judicial
power."9 6 Second, as an act of legislative review of the final judgments of
federal courts, it invades the judicial branch's exclusive power under Article III to adjudicate cases.97 Thus, "section 27A(b) improperly nullifies
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lampf and the final judgements of
other federal courts which [had] dismissed [section] 10(b)-5 actions in
accord with Lampf and Beam." 98
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Brichardopinion was not yet
complete. Judge Legge next addressed the impact of section 27A on
Beam. 99 He declared that Beam was a "constitutional decision," and
therefore one that Congress could not change by mere statutory
enactment. '0
The court first asserted that the rule announced in Lampf was inextricably intertwined with Beam, and thus rejected the argument made by
both the United States and the SEC that Beam does not preclude Congress from "curtail[ing] the retroactive effect" of Lampf.'° ' The district
judge then rejoined that Beam not only announced a rule of retroactivity,
but that it applied its own rule retroactively to pending cases.' 0 2
In response, the plaintiffs argued that section 27A did not affect the
nexus between Beam and Lampf.103 Instead, they suggested, it merely
ensured that the new one-year/three-year rule would only be applied
prospectively." ° Acknowledging some support for that argument, the
court nevertheless ruled that the plaintiffs' argument "[did] not answer
the violence that section 27A did to Beam."'0 5
By compelling Beam only to apply prospectively, said the court, section 27A conflicts with the retroactivity rule announced by the Supreme
Court in that decision. 0 6 In other words, "[s]ection 27A replaces the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citations omitted).
at 1107 (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792)).
(citing United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641 (1874)).
at 1108 (citations omitted).
at 1109.

105. Id.
106. Id.
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Beam decision against selective prospectivity with a law of selective prospectivity in certain cases.""1 7 For this additional reason Judge Legge
found section 27A unconstitutional.
Brichard is also significant in view of its handling of the United
States' argument that Beam was not a ruling of constitutional import.
The U.S. Attorney General had asserted that Beam was not a constitutional decision because a majority of the Justices "did not base their decisions on constitutional grounds." 108 Nevertheless, the court held that
those opinions demonstrated that the Supreme Court concurred that its
decision was in fact based on constitutional grounds. 1°9
Likewise, Judge Legge rejected that same argument when the
Brichard plaintiffs raised it. First, Brichard quoted a decision by the
Supreme Court in a criminal case which held that the failure to apply a
newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct
review violated basic norms of constitutional adjudication.110
Second, Judge Legge contended that "Justice Souter's depiction of
the issue in Beam as a choice of law problem cannot be interpreted as a
judgment that the Beam decision rests on less than constitutional
ground[s]."'
Rejecting the simultaneous contention that the application of section 27A "is merely a statutory issue,""1 2 Judge Legge ruled
that although the constitutional grounds for Beam may be mixed, the
case was ultimately based on the Constitution." 3 This finding thus compelled the declaration that section 27A is unconstitutional, since "Congress may not enact a law that contravenes the Supreme Court's
judgment on questions of constitutional interpretation."1'1 4
Notwithstanding its holding, the Brichard court recognized "the
concerns that prompted Congress to enact section 27A." '15 Nevertheless, it held that "such concerns cannot override the Constitution." 1'1 6
Pulling these diverse elements together one last time, the court summarized the reasons for its rejection of section 27A as unconstitutional:
107. Iad
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id
Id
Id at 1110 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).
Id
Id
Id at 1111-12.
Id at 1112 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803)).
Id
Id
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Congress did not enact a statute of limitations for [section] 10(b) actions. Instead, without making any change in the underlying law,
Congress attempted to direct the outcome of a certain group of cases.

Section 27A intrudes into the powers reserved to the judiciary by Article III, and violates the constitutional separation of powers between
the judicial and legislative branches.1 17
And so, following Brichard'slead, a number of district courts have
now struck out against section 27A. They have voided the statute as
unconstitutional on the basis of the related yet diverse reasons that it
violates the constitutional doctrines of separation of powers, equal protection, and other crucial dogma. But these cases represent but one side
of the debate.
D. The Challenge Rejected
Just as the foregoing cases have held section 27A unconstitutional as
an impermissible attempt to affect judgments in specific cases, others
have found that section 27A serves a perfectly legitimate legislative function. One of the first cases finding section 27A viable was Bankard v.
First Carolina Communications."' Judge Hart, the author of the
Bankard opinion, had previously applied Lampf retroactively in light of
Beam, even though "the issue of retroactive application was not ex119
pressly discussed by the [Lampf] majority."
In Bankard,Judge Hart held that "[s]ection 27A precludes application" of Lampf retroactively. 12 0 The Bankard court summarily rejected
2
the defendants' claims that the limitary statute was unconstitutional.' 1
The court asserted that section 27A does not direct the courts to make a
particular factual finding or to reach a particular decision on the merits
of any securities fraud claim.' 22 Hence, the principles of separation of
power are not violated. 123 The defendants' argument did not merit con24
sideration because the court found the underlying premise to be false.'
Judge Hart elaborated that "Congress has changed the law and that it
might seem otherwise only because instead of delineating fully the
change of law, Congress has made the change by reference, incorporating
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
No. 89-8571, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53 (N.D. i. Jan. 3, 1992).
Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 480, 483 (N.D. InI. 1991).
Bankard, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15 n.5.
I at *19.
Id at *17-18.
Id
Id at 18.
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' 125
the prevailing law in the applicable jurisdiction."
Additionally, Judge Hart found the defendants' due process argument against section 27A to be "without merit" because the enactment of
the statute did not deprive the defendants of any vested right. 2 6 Addressing the contention that section 27A lacked the "rational purpose"
necessary to pass muster on equal protection principles, the court countered that it is not irrational to keep in effect existing rules regarding127
a
statute of limitations until parties have notice of the changed rule.
Giving such notice prevents parties from being injured by relying on old,
superseded law. 1 28 Thus, ruled the court, Congress had a rational basis
for permitting limitation periods that may have differed among jurisdictions before June 20, 1991 to remain in effect. As of that same day, the
court reasoned, securities fraud litigants would have notice of a uniform
standard for all jurisdictions. 1 29 The court concluded that since it does
not affect any protected category of persons and is rational, the statute
130
does not violate equal protection.

An Ohio district court rejected similar challenges to section 27A in
Ayers v. Sutliffe,' 3 ' in which the court reinstated the plaintiffs' causes of
action over the defendant's opposition. The defendant contended that
section 27A violated the separation of powers doctrine and the Due Pro32
cess and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
Dismissing these contentions, District Judge Carl B. Rubin concluded that Lampf and Beam "clearly effected a change in the existing
law.., in this and many other jurisdictions" by establishing a one-year/
three-year limitations period for section 10(b) actions, and that Beam
33
compelled the retroactive application of the new limitary period.
125. Id.; In re Taxable Mun. Bond See. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,802, at 93,119 (E.D. La. May 20, 1992) (holding that § 27A "simply modified a defense"
without affecting the merits of the underlying claim, and therefore was constitutional); Fred Hindler,
Inc. v. Telequest, Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %96,634, at 92,990

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1992) (holding that by amending an existing statute, Congress did not violate
separation of powers doctrine); In re Melridge, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 87-1426-JU, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3477, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 20, 1992).
126. Bankard, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS at *19.
127. Id. at *18.
128. Id
129. Id.

130. Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
11, 1992).
132. Id. at 92,537.
133. Id. at 92,537.

96,552, at 92,536 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
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However, the passage of section 27A changed that law yet again, forbidding retroactive application of Lampf even under the traditional
analysis.

134

Next, the court held that section 27A does not violate the separation
of powers doctrine. The court opined first that by enacting section 27A,
Congress had
simply eliminated a defense available to defendants in an unidentified
number of cases based on the date on which the cases were filed. Second, as a general rule, if Congress changes the law during the pendency of a case, the courts are obligated to apply the law as they find it
at the time of judgment .... This court's current understanding of the
law is that it must apply the laws of this Circuit setting forth the limitations period for [section] lOb-5 cases as such laws existed on June 19,
1991.13

Moreover, in finding that section 27A does not violate either the due
process or equal protection doctrines, Judge Rubin eloquently stated the
essential raison d'etre of the remedial provision, holding that:
[a]pplication of [section 27A] will further the legitimate legislative purpose of allowing those claimants who timely fied securities fraud
claims under the then applicable law to pursue such claims. Further,
there is a rational basis for applying [section 27A] only to those claimants who filed claims prior to the date the decisions in Lampf and
Beam were handed down. Those claimants had no notice that a law
other than that which was in effect on the date they filed their claims
136
would govern the question of whether the claims were timely filed.
For these reasons, the Ayers court found that section 27A was constitutional and thus valid.
District Judge Huff reached a similar result in First v. Prudential
Bache Securities, Inc.'37 The defendants had "argue[d] that the limitations period provided by section 27A does not apply because the section
is unconstitutional."1 38 The court held that section 27A does not offend
the doctrine of separation of powers because Congress did not focus on
the merits of any particular case to determine which claims are timely
and which are not.1 39 Rather, the court believed, "[i]n enacting section
134. Id. Accord Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 589-90 (E.D.N.C.
1992) (reinstating § 10(b) claims without discussion).
135. Ayers, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,537.

136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,622, at 92,918 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
24, 1992).
138. Id. at 92,919.
139. Id.
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27A, Congress acted rationally and not arbitrarily. The rational purpose
behind the legislation is to define a statutory claim... and to reinstate
claims Congress believed should be resolved on the merits."1 4 ' Judge
Huff concluded that "[m]erely because the defendants feel a uniform rule
is more appropriate and better reasoned does not mean that, by choosing
a different rule, Congress acted irrationally," and that section 27A does
not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clause.14
Finally, the eminent Judge Morris Lasker rendered a cogent opinion
embracing section 27A in Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., in
which the court held that section 27A did not implicate due process or
separation of powers concerns. 142 Granting relief to the plaintiff from
the previous dismissal of its securities fraud suit as untimely, the court
found that the new statute "exhibits the central characteristic of legislation, as opposed to adjudication."' 143 Before reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that Congress has the power to set limitary periods and "to
apply [them] retroactively as well as prospectively.""
"[C]hanging a
statute of limitations is at heart a legislative task," and the Supreme
Court's action in Lampf was possible only because of the absence of a
specific provision regulating section 10(b) actions. 4
Section 27A not only possesses these "hallmarks of legislation,"
continued Judge Lasker, but also lacks the traditional "attributes of adjudication. It does not refer to this or any other case by name, [or] dictate
specific findings of fact or conclusions of law in any case."' 146 The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the new law was intended to entrap selected high-profile securities fraud defendants and found that this
assertion was "belied by [section] 27A's applicability to a generally identified set of cases.' 47 "IT]he mere fact that new legislation reaches even
a very few cases that existed at the time of enactment and were intended
to be influenced by the legislation does not render the legislation...
unconstitutional" as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.' 148
140. Id
141. Id
142. 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
143. Id. at 479.
144. Id at 478 (declaring that the Supreme Court's recent reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992), undercut defendant's separation of powers
argument). In Robertson, the Court upheld § 27A because it modified the existing law by replacing
the legal standards against which the challenged conduct would be judged. Id. at 1413-14.
145. Axel Johnson, Inc., 790 F. Supp. at 479 n.2.

146. Id. at 479.
147. Id. at 480.
148. Id.
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The court then addressed the viability of subsection (b) of section
27A. The defendant's admittedly potent argument was that the new law
unconstitutionally revived previously adjudicated cases. 149 In spite of
that comparatively stronger claim, the court found that the reworked
statute of limitations did not merely reverse decided cases: Instead, it
imposed a new statute of limitations for cases filed before Lampf was
issued. The court thus held that separation of power principles do not
preclude such legislative revision.'5 0
Acknowledging the disunity among federal district courts on the
constitutionality of section 27A,15 ' Judge Lasker nevertheless found the
law valid. 52 The court enumerated four reasons why the so-called "final
judgment" of the earlier dismissal had not vested any rights in the

defendant. 153
First, the apparent finality of the earlier judgment was rendered
"less certain" by the short time that had elapsed between the execution of
judgment and the passage of section 27A.'5 4 This was particularly true
in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which permits a court
to relieve a party from a final judgment where a motion under that rule is
made within a reasonable time not more than one year after the judgment.15 5 The plaintiff in Axel Johnson had made a motion pursuant to
15 6
that same rule.
Second, "the artificiality and technicality of the sole reason" for the
earlier dismissal, "which had nothing to do with [the] merits" of the case,
favored the relief requested by the plaintiff.'5 7 A law (such as section
27A) that alters such a technical defense "goes far less to the heart of the
judicial function than would a legislative attempt to reverse adjudications" made upon the merits.'
Third, ruled Judge Lasker, a contrary result would be "too arbitrary
and burdensome" to plaintiffs whose proceedings were dismissed after
Lamp! but before Congress enacted section 27A. 15 9
And finally, noted the court, Congress promulgated section 27A not
149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id

at 481.
at 483-84.
at 482-84.
at 482.
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
at 477.
at 482.
at 483.
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to isolate and reverse decided cases, but rather to provide relief for a
broadly defined class of claimants from what it deemed to be an unfair
rule.1" "Such evenhanded treatment is less threatening to the judiciary's
independence than would be Congressional action to reverse particular
adjudications."16' 1 For these reasons, no claim of unconstitutionality
against section 27A could survive, and the plaintiff was entitled to reinstate its section 10(b) claim.
After reviewing the arguments addressed in Axel Johnson, one can
begin to survey the battle lines drawn by the numerous districts courts
that have had the opportunity to pass upon the viability of section 27A.
Those opposed to its continued existence have argued mightily, invoking
various constitutional doctrines such as separation of powers, due process, and equal protection. Conversely, those who support the efficacy
and propriety of the new law have had no such difficulties dealing with
allegations that section 27A is unconstitutional. Although the latter
cases may not delve into the constitutional questions to the same degree
as the former, they possess the singular virtue of finding that section 27A
is an appropriate exercise of Congress' lawmaking power. Each decision
upholding section 27A disposes handily of the attacks on the constitutionality of that law, finding that the legislators acted well within the
scope of their enumerated powers.
E. The Circuits in Waiting
Given the growing controversy among federal district judges, it is
clear that the issue of the constitutionality of section 27A will not be
settled at the trial level. Rather, only guidance from the appellate circuits will resolve the lingering question. Accordingly, we now turn to
review the efforts of the federal circuits.
The case of Henley v. Slone16 2 could provide an answer to this crisis.
In Henley, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded an
160. Iad
161. 1d; see also Brown v. The Hutton Group, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,624 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1992) ("Section 27A merely turns back the legal clock to the
period just prior to Lampf and then permits courts independently to adjudicate any reopened actions

on the basis of the law as they determine it then existed."); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F.
Supp. 1235, (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same). Cf Philip Morris Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp.,
[1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,629 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1992) (refusing
to reinstate previously dismissed sucurities fraud claims on the grounds that they would be untimely
even under § 27A, and therefore not reaching the statute's constitutionality).
162. 961 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1992).
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appeal to allow the district court to reconsider the timeliness of the plaintiff's section 10(b) suit. The decision bears examination on several
points.
First, the unanimous tribunal agreed that "prior to June 19, [1991]
this Court had anticipated Lampf by adopting the one-year/three-year
limitations period in Ceres Partnersv. GEL Associates. However, on June
19, it was also the law of this Circuit that Ceres Partnerswas not to be
applied retroactively as a routine matter." '6 3 Closely examining section
27A, Circuit Judge Newman suggested that the limitations period on
anti-fraud suits "is to be governed not by automatic application of the
state limitations period that preceded Ceres Partners,but by a case-specific determination of whether the retroactivity principles applied in
[Welch v. Cadre Capital] make it inappropriate to apply the new limitations period."' 6
For these reasons, the panel was compelled to follow the clear statutory language of section 27A, which requires the application of "the laws
applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity.' 165 In
Henley, this meant that the one-year/three-year rule of Ceres Partners
applied "sparingly" in light of the retroactivity principles enunciated in
Welch 1.166
Notwithstanding this support for the strictly prospective application

of the one-year/three-year rule, the Second Circuit neatly left the defendants' constitutional challenge to section 27A undecided.167 The panel
explicitly declined to anticipate the constitutional issue unless and until it
was determined that Henley's suit was timely under section 27A. If the
district court determined that the suit was timely, the Second Circuit

would consider any constitutional challenges the appellees might choose
to present at that time. 168
163. Id. at 25 (citing Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir. 1990)). See also
Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.) (Welch 1), judgment vacated and remandedsub
nom., Northwest Say. Bank PaSA v. Welch, 111 S.Ct. 2882, 2882-83, remanded, 946 F.2d 185 (2d
Cir. 1991) (Welch I1). Ceres Partnersestablished the one-year/three-year rule as controlling in the
Second Circuit before Lampfwas decided. Ceres Partners,918 F.2d at 364. Welch I, which originally held that the Ceres rule was not to be applied retroactively, was remanded in light of Lampf.
Welch I, 923 F.2d at 993.
164. Henley, 961 F.2d at 25. See also Brown, [1992] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,624, at 92,927
n.3. In Henley, the Second Circuit envisioned the retroactive application of Ceres Partners"in only
the very narrowest of circumstances, if any." Id. at 92,927 n.3.
165. Henley, 961 F.2d at 26 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1 (West Supp. 1992)).
166. Id. at 25-26.

167. Id. at 26.
168. Id.
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Despite the refusal of the Second Circuit to pass on the constitutional merits of section 27A, one might find a possible outcome of an
eventual examination of that issue in Welch v. Cadre Capital (Welch
I1),169 the decision rendered after the remand of that case by the Supreme
1 70

Court.

Not surprisingly, the Second Circuit found the plaintiff's securities
fraud claims time-barred pursuant to the Lampf rule, as applied retroactively. 17 1 More important, however, was Circuit Judge Newman's discussion of the confusion surrounding the retroactivity issue.
Acknowledging the Supreme Court's application of the new limitary
rule to the plaintiffs in Lampf, the panel opined that the retroactive application had prevailed over a dissenting opinion which pointed out that
"the Court had previously declined to apply new statute of limitations
rules to the litigation in which the new rule was announced." 172 Therefore, noted the court, one could argue that
Lampf applied the new limitations rule retroactively to the litigation in
which the rule was announced to avoid Article III concerns about advisory opinions, without implying that the new rule applie[d] retroactively to all other lawsuits still pending on direct review. 1 73That
argument, however, is foreclosed by the decision in Jim Beam.
Therefore, the Second Circuit felt compelled in Welch II to "apply
Lampf retroactively to all cases." 174 Nevertheless, the unanimous panel
made it plain that it would prefer to apply the new one-year/three-year
rule only prospectively:
Were it not for Jim Beam, we would welcome the opportunity to withhold retroactive application of the new limitations rule from all plaintiffs (other than those in the Lampf litigation) who filed timely under
the pre-existing limitations period, for all of the reasons we set forth in
Welch I. But, until advised to the contrary, we feel obliged to disregard the prior teaching of Saint Francis College and apply the more
169. 946 F.2d 185 (1991).
170. See Welch I, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.),judgmentvacated and remandedsub noa. Northwest
Say. Bank, PaSA v. Welch, 111 S. Ct. 2882, remanded,946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1991) (Welch I1). The
Second Circuit reversed itself in Welch II and reinstated the original judgment of the district court,
735 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1989). Welch 11 followed Lampf, which had already been decided, but
preceded the enactment of section 27A by more than two full months.
171. Welch II, 946 F.2d at 186.
172. Id. (citing Lampf, I 11 S. Ct. at 2785).
173. Id. at 186. See also Sterling v. Block, 953 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that Beam
dictates that a prospectivity analysis is inappropriate if the new rule was retroactively applied to the
parties in the case in which it was originally announced).
174. Welch II, 946 F.2d at 187.
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75
recent guidance of Jim Beam.1

Welch H represents an enigma with respect to the effect of Lampf.
Taking Welch H at face value, one finds that the Second Circuit seems to
imply support for the full retroactivity of Lampf in light of Beam.76
However, in the same breath the panel clings to the prospective application-only rule that it asserted in Welch I. Moreover, Judge Newman indicates that the circuit court did not use the test established in Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson 17 for retroactivity for the sole reason that the panel
78
believed that Beam did not give it sufficiently broad latitude to do so.'
Yet aside from these intimations, the fact remains that Welch H was
issued before section 27A became law. Therefore, one must wonder how
much of Welch H (if any) will survive in the post-section 27A world.
Clearly, the Second Circuit had the opportunity in Henley to reaffirm the
conclusions of law that it set forth in Welch II. One might interpret its
failure to do so as a sign that the enactment of section 27A dramatically
reduced the precedential value of Welch II.
The panel in Welch H was reluctant to apply Lampf retroactively,
especially in light of: (1) Justice O'Connor's strong opposition to such an
application; (2) the Supreme Court's omission of any discussion of that
subject in Lampf, and; (3) the Court's failure to reconcile Lampf with
other existing precedents safeguarding the retroactive application of new
law.179 It is at least possible that the Second Circuit or some other federal circuit could view Lampf's lack of cohesion as indirect support for
the constitutional validity of section 27A. In any event, numerous outcomes are available when and if the Second or any other circuit takes a
fresh look at Lampf's retroactivity in view of the statute. As the next
section reveals, such a review may soon be forthcoming.
F.

Anixter-The Tenth CircuitAwaits

The precise question of the effect of section 27A on Lampf's retroactivity was briefly before the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari
encaptioned Dennler v. Trippet.'8 0 This appeal to the Supreme Court
asked whether section 27A requires the reversal of a Tenth Circuit decision ordering dismissal of the plaintiffs' section 10(b) claims as time175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id (citing Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)).
Id. at 187-88.
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
Welch II, 946 F.2d at 186-88.
Lampf, II S. Ct. at 2785-86.
112 S. Ct. 1658, amended by 112 S. Ct. 1757 (1992).
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barred, based on a retroactive application of Lampf."I The plaintiffs asserted that this dismissal could not stand in light of section 27A. Therefore, the plaintiffs
assert, the decision below should be reversed and
18 2
remanded.
In the disputed Tenth Circuit opinion, Anixter v. Home-Stake
Production Co.,"' the plaintiffs had sued the defendants alleging securi84
ties fraud in the sale of interests in oil and gas production programs.1
The plaintiffs contended that Home-Stake Production Company (HomeStake), an Oklahoma-based developer of oil and gas properties, defrauded investors via "an elaborate and ongoing scheme" through which
it offered tax deductions in the form of intangible drilling costs (IDCs) in
addition to a return on the investors' capital.'
Between 1964 and 1972, Home-Stake set up subsidiaries called annual Program Operating Corporations (POCs). The POCs represented
distinct production programs registered by Home-Stake with the SEC.
"Contrary to Home-Stake's representations, however, investments in...
POCs were not directed at developing the particular oil property, but
instead were recirculated and recharacterized, ultimately to be distributed to subsequent POC purchasers in the form of quarterly
payments
81 6
production."'
oil
from
income
represent
to
purported
Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that Home-Stake had perpetrated
a classic Ponzi scheme.'8 7 A trial culminated in a jury verdict totalling
approximately $130 million for all plaintiffs."" On the subsequent appeal, Circuit Judge Moore initially stated that the only issue to be resolved was whether, given the plaintiffs' contentions that principles of
equitable tolling and equitable estoppel should be applied to save their
claims from dismissal as time barred, 8 9 the plaintiffs' actions were timely
under section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.19°
Notwithstanding its initial devotion to that sole issue, the panel examined the timeliness of the plaintiffs' section 10(b) claims "under both
181. Id.
182. See High CourtRemands Case to CA lO for Reconsideration; CitesSec. 27A, 24 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 606 (Apr. 24, 1992).
183. 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991), cert granted andjudgment vacated sub nom., Dennler v.
Trippett, 112 S. Ct. 1658, amended by 112 S. Ct. 1757 (1992).
184. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1429.
185. Id. at 1430.
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id
189. Id. at 1435-36.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
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the Oklahoma statute of limitations for fraud and [under] the... federal
scheme."1'91 The Tenth Circuit first analyzed those claims in the context
of the one-year/three-year limitary period established by the Third Circuit in In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation.'92 Given that
Anixter was decided little more than a month after Lampf was issued, the
panel also looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in that case, as well as
to its own discussion of the plaintiffs' claims under section 13.193 On
these bases, the court found the plaintiffs' claims to be barred as
untimely.
Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing en banc by the
Tenth Circuit.19 4 The SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the
plaintiffs. 19" Granting rehearing in part in order to clarify its original
opinion, the same panel stated that its second purpose in acting on the
petition was to "dispose of the issue of the retroactive application of
' 96
Lampf.'
Writing once more for a three-judge panel, Circuit Judge Moore interpreted Lampf in reliance on Beam. Proceeding from Beam, the panel
held that:
[the Supreme] Court grounded the question of retroactivity 'entirely to
an issue ofchoice of law' and stated, 'when the Court has applied a rule
of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all
others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata.' A week
later, the Court granted a writ of certiorari in [Welch I], which had
held that Ceres Partnersv. GEL Associates met 'the threshold [Chevron] requirement for nonretroactive application.' The Court vacated
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the discussion in James Beam and [Lampf].
Consequently, the Court has re197
solved the issue of retroactivity.
Thus, once more compelled to apply Lampf retroactively, the Tenth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing without further

comment. 198
191. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1440.
192. Id. at 1440-41 (citing In re Data Access Sys. See. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1546 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U.S. 849 (1988)).
193. Id. at 1441-42.
194. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 947 F.2d 897, 898 (10th Cir. 1991) (ruling on motion for

rehearing).
195. Id. at 898.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 899 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
198. Id.
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The Supreme Court reacted swiftly to the plaintiffs' petition for review. The Justices vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anixter and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of section 27A. 19 9 In so
doing, the High Court has set the stage for the Tenth Circuit to make a
landmark ruling on the constitutionality of the new limitary statute.
Although one last appeal to the Supreme Court seems inevitable, the decision of the Tenth Circuit should at least be highly influential and possibly dispositive in deciding whether section 27A is constitutional.

IV. ANALYsis
Although it is an appropriate topic of intense and lengthy discussion, the essence of the section 27A/Lampf retroactivity controversy is
quite simple: The precise question is whether section 27A can prohibit
the retroactive application of the new limitary rule pronounced in Lampf
without offending the Constitution. This article suggests that despite
declarations to the contrary, section 27A is constitutional.
A.

Chase Securities---The Benevolent Parent of Section 27A?

Critical to this analysis is Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,2" in
which the Supreme Court addressed a similar sitaution to the one
presented here. In that case, the defendant complained that a revision to
the Minnesota "blue sky" law governing the intrastate sale of securities
had the effect of "lift[ing] the bar of the statute of limitations in a pending litigation" and amounted to a taking of its property without due process of law. 20 1 The High Court disagreed, holding that a state legislature
may constitutionally "repeal or extend a statute of limitations, even after
a right of action is barred thereby, restore to the plaintiff his remedy, and
'20 2
divest the defendant of the statutory bar.
Notably, the Court found the statute at issue to be "a general one,
applying to all similarly situated persons or transactions," and involving
a number of cases. While the motivation behind the law's enactment
could spring from "a few cases or ... a single case," that motivation
alone would not establish a denial of equal protection. 203 The Justices
agreed that the legislation merely reinstated a lapsed remedy, that the
199. Dennler v. Trippett, 112 S.Ct. 1658, amended by 112 S.Ct. 1757 (1992) (Justices Douglas
and Thomas took no part in this decision).
200. 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
201. Id at 305.
202. Id. at 311-12.
203. Id at 309 n.5.
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defendant had no "vested right to immunity" from such a legislative revision, and that the reinstatement of this remedy did not violate the the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2"
Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled unequivocally that although the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the taking of life, liberty, or property
without due process, it "does not make an act of state legislation void
merely because it has some retrospective operation."20 5 The Court found
that "it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as
to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense"
against the Constitution.20 6 This pronouncement is consistent with Congress' established power to change the law.
It was also important that the defendant in Chase did not point out
any "special hardships or oppressive effects" suffered because of the law's
retroactivity.20 7 Moreover, under the circumstances presented in Chase
Securities, no constitutional right exists to preclude a change in the relevant law before a case is finally adjudicated: The defendant "had
acquired no immunity from this suit that has become a federal constitu8
tional right.

20

Chase Securities is also remarkable for its almost metaphysical discussion of statutes of limitation in general. Justice Jackson wrote that
these provisions "always have vexed the philosophical mind for it is difficult to fit them into a completely logical and symmetrical system of
law.1 2°9 He continued:

Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than
principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare courts
from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his
defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared,
and evidence has been lost. They are by definition arbitrary, and their
operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim,
or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law
not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has
never been regardedas what now iscalled a fundamental' right or what
used to be called a 'natural' right of the individual. He may, of course,
204. Id. at 312 n.8.
205. Id. at 315.
206. Id. at 316; see also International Union Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 244 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
207. Chase Secs. Corp., 325 U.S. at 316.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 313.
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have the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history ofpleas
of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be
subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control
[S]tatutes of limitation go to matters of remedy, not to destruction
of fundamental rights. The abstract logic of the distinction between
substantive rights and remedial or procedural rights
2 10 may not be clearcut, but it has been found a workable concept.
In retrospect, the statute litigated in Chase Securities bears many
clear parallels to section 27A. Section 27A, for example, merely restores
a remedy to a plaintiff, while divesting defendants of but a single defense.
It does not discriminate, as its impact is felt broadly by a general set of
similarly situated litigants. For this reason, section 27A does not affect
constitutional rights.
Given such similarities of function and design, is it not likely that
today's Supreme Court would find the recent limitary enactment constitutional for the same reasons? Justice Jackson puts the entire issue into
perspective by positing that statutes of limitations are largely matters of
legislative discretion and that they rarely implicate rights of constitutional import. Today's judiciary would be well advised to maintain such
a perspective in these matters.
B. Separation of Powers: Still Separate?
The concerns voiced by district courts that have invalidated section
27A as an impermissible intrusion into the power granted the judiciary
by Article III are dramatically overstated. For instance, constitutional
landmark cases on this point, such as Northern Pipeline Construction. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,2 are of little use, if any, in the present controversy. Other modem decisions delineating the separation of powers
delegated under Articles I and III have focused on adjudicative bodies
created by Article I and whether they wrongly competed for powers exclusively reserved to the judiciary by Article 111.212 These matters are
not implicated in the dispute over the constitutionality of section 27A.
Congress clearly may not usurp the judiciary power under Article
210. Id. at 314 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
211. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Northern 'peline upheld a constitutional challenge to the reconstituted
bankruptcy courts because those tribunals improperly exercised the "essential attributes" of judicial
power.
212. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985); Commodities
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986).
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III to adjudicate cases. Therefore, it may not enact legislation that "prescribe[s] rules of decision to the judicial branch of the government in
cases pending before it" unless it changes an underlying substantive or
procedural law. 13 Likewise, Congress may not enact a change in the law
that upsets the results of the final judgments of the courts.2 14
However, none of these weighty concerns are present here. Section
27A is, in reality, a law made by Congress like any other law. It was
motivated by Congress' disagreement with a judicial interpretation of an
earlier statute. And it is undisputed that Congress can amend or repeal a
statutory provision. At its heart, section 27A amends section 10(b) and
is precisely aimed at the limitary period that Lampf imposed on actions
arising under that statute: It merely interprets related provisions of the
federal securities acts. Courts finding no constitutional defects with section 27A have done so largely because they view the statute in that manner. Conversely, courts that have struck the statute as unconstitutional
quite simply read too much into new law.
In Brichard,the court admitted that the circuits were in disagreement over the appropriate limitary period for section 10(b) at the time
Lampf was decided. However, the same court stubbornly and incorrectly refused to conclude that Congress made a new law when it enacted
section 27A. Section 27A was an appropriate congressional response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf. Congress intended to codify the
one-year/three-year limitary period that would impose a pre-existing rule
of limitation on pending cases by repealing or amending interstitial law
created around the anti-fraud section of the federal securities code. Even
Judge Beer in TGX Corp., an anti-section 27A decision, admitted that the
new statute marked a true change in existing law by these classic
methods.21 5
Additionally, suggestions that section 27A violates separation of
powers principles miss the issue. The district courts that take umbrage at
section 27A on separation of powers grounds simply misstate the doctrine's applicability to the new statute. For example, Judge Babcock in
213. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
214. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3529.1, at 302 (1985).
215. 786 F. Supp. at 592 ("Congresshas changed the law with the enactment off[§ 27A: Section
27A represents a change in the law, such that Congress has not contravened the separation of powers
principle established by Klein and its progeny.").
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Bank of Denver2 16 cited Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices2 17 in
support of his separation of powers argument that section 27A was unconstitutional.2"' However, that district court erred by quoting the
Nixon case, for there the Supreme Court actually found that the statute
did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The heart of the
politically charged controversy in Nixon was the constitutionality of a
congressional enactment designed to preserve the documents and tape
2 19
recordings of former President Nixon after he resigned the presidency.
Inter alia, Mr. Nixon asserted that the law violated the separation of
powers between the executive and legislative branches.220
The Supreme Court rejected this contention. Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan explained that the separation of powers between the coordinate branches of government is not automatically violated when the
alleged intrusion actually robs one branch of its ability to function properly. Instead, noted the Court,
in determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between
the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to
which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption
is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by
an overriding need to
promote objectives within the constitutional au22
thority of Congress.
In short, if nothing in a law is "unduly disruptive" of the branch it af' 222
fects, the law cannot be said to be "unconstitutional on its face.
Therefore, one cannot find support for the contention that section
27A violates the doctrine of separation of powers in the Nixon case or
any other. The new limitary statute does not invade or even encroach on
the function of any other branch; it merely sets forth a bright-line division of the applicable periods for a metamorphasized limitary rule, as
modified by Congress in its rightful function of repealing or amending
law.
C.

Equal Protection
Some district courts have taken exception to section 27A on the
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

789 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992).
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1095.
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429-30.
Id.
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
Id at 444-45.
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grounds that it unconstitutionally deprives similarly situated persons of
equal protection of the law. The gist of this argument seems to be that by
modifying slightly the applicability of a new limitary period, Congress
has deprived litigants in federal securities fraud actions of a substantive
or procedural right of constitutional magnitude. This is plainly an overbearing, if not oppressive, interpretation of the rational limits of the
Equal Protection Clause.
As the Court previously pointed out in Harris v. McRae,2 2 "[tihe
guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a source
of substantive rights or liberties, but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity."22 4 Where "Congress has neither invaded a substantial
constitutional right or freedom, nor enacted legislation that purposefully
operates to the detriment of a suspect class, the only requirement of equal
protection is that congressional action be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."2 2 Referring again to the Nixon landmark,
in which Mr. Nixon truthfuly occupied a class of one, the Supreme
Court held that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a
law under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment,"
even if the law disadvantages an individual or identifiable members of a
6
22

group.

By compelling only a prospective usage of the new limitary period
indicated by Lampf, section 27A does not affect the basic liberty interests
of parties to securities fraud actions. Any suggestion that the new statute
abridges such constitutional guarantees is exaggerated. Rather, section
27A does more to protect equality under the law by restoring the status
quo ante: Parties that filed suits under section 10(b) pursuant to thenexisting limitary periods may proceed unmolested. Thus, by enacting
section 27A, Congress did not invidiously discriminate or make suspect
classifications in violation of the equal protection doctrine. At worst,
section 27A might disadvantage an identifiable member of a group,
although this argument is not persuasive, considering that the retroactive
223. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
224. Id. at 322.
225. Id. at 326 (emphasis added). Accord G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408 (1982)
("In the absence of a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges upon fundamental
rights, a state statute is to be upheld against equal protection attack if it is rationally related to the
achievement of legitimate governmental ends.").
226. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471 n.33 (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966)). See, eg., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
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application of Lampf would have been a windfall for a section 10(b) defendant (who never could have anticipated the statute's availability as a
defense).
Finally, the rational relationship standard is easily met here because
the legislative revision to section 10(b), a federal regulatory scheme created by Congress more than a half-century ago, is merely a rational exercise of the lawmakers' will to amend a body of law that it had created to
make that law more equitable to all it affects. In sum, any constitutional
challenge to section 27A on this basis must fail.
D. ProhibitionsAgainst Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
Other constitutional mandates have no bearing on the controversy
over the validity of section 27A. It is important to distinguish between
the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence in criminal cases and
rulings in civil proceedings. Unfortunately, such cases as Brichard22 7 fail
to recognize this difference and thus incorrectly apply precedents from
the criminal arena to civil disputes when the criminal cases properly have
little bearing, if any, on the civil cases.
Among the constitutional landmarks to be excepted from this general rule is the three-prong test of retroactivity for newly constituted
rules of criminal procedure, as first established over two decades ago in
Linkletter v. Walker 228 and modified in United States v. Johnson,22 9 and
Griffith v. Kentucky.2 30 Judge Legge relied upon both Linkletter and
231
Griffith when deciding Brichard.
Griffith reminds that Johnson "did not address the area of civil retroactivity. '23 2 Additionally, in concluding the majority opinion, Justice
Blackmun specified that the precise holding in Griffith was "that a new
rule for the conduct of criminalprosecutionsis to be applied retroactively
to all cases." 23' 3 Thus, federal courts should not consider the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffith and its progeny when deciding issues of retroactivity in civil cases.
For these reasons, the Ex Post Facto Clause2 34 has no place in the
controversy surrounding section 27A, as traditionally that clause has
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
457 U.S. 537 (1982).
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
788 F. Supp. at 1110-11.
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 n.8 (citing Johnson, 457 U.S. at 563).
Id at 328 (emphasis added).
U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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barred only "penal legislation which imposes or increases criminal punishment" for previously lawful conduct.2 35 Chief Justice Rehnquist recently postulated that "[a]lthough the Latin phrase 'ex post facto'
literally encompasses any law passed 'after the fact,' it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto
laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender af26
fected by them."
As a related matter, the counterpart to the prohibition against ex
post facto laws-the prohibition against bills of attainder 37-- is not in
any way implicated in the dispute over the constitutionality of section
27A. This is so because that constitutional "proscription... reaches
only statutes that inflict punishment on the specified individual or
group. ' 238 Moreover, a law that "furthers nonpunitive legislative goals"
without inflicting punishment does not violate the Constitution.2 39
Nixon also addressed a bill of attainder argument. 240 The former
President asserted that by passing a law which removed him as the custodian of his presidential papers, Congress had essentially enacted a classic
bill of attainder, "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." 24
Notably, Justice Brennan opined that the Bill of Attainder Clause is
"an important ingredient" of the separation of powers doctrine because it
prevents Congress from intruding on the function of the judiciary. 24 2
Admittedly, earlier Supreme Court cases "unquestionably gave broad
and generous meaning to the constitutional protection against bins of
attainder."2 4 3 Nevertheless, held the Court, this pervasive concept cannot rightly be carried to an extreme. Rejecting Mr. Nixon's all-encompassing view, the High Court ruled that:
235. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (upholding a deportation law attacked
on constitutional grounds, including for violations of the Due Process Clause, as "a civil rather than
a criminal" measure).
236. Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990).
237. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
238. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984).
Compare United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (holding that a statute which denies
compensation to specified government employees "clearly accomplishes the punishment of named
individuals without a judicial trial").
239. Selective Serv. Sy&, 468 U.S. at 856.

240. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468.
241. Id. (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1985)).
243. IM
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By arguing that an individual or defined group is attainted whenever
he or it is compelled to bear burdens which the individual or group
dislikes, appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill of attainder
guarantee to realistic conceptions of classification and punishment.
His view would cripple the very process of legislating, for any individual or group that is made the subject of adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers could and should have defined the relevant
affected class at a greater level of generality. Furthermore, every person or group made subject to legislation which he or it finds burdensome may subjectively feel, and can complain, that he or it is being
subjected to unwarranted punishment. However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a
variant of the equal protection doctrine, invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups
but not all other plausible individuals. In short, while the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important 'bulwark against tyranny,' it
does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating for the
universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all.
T]he fact that [the statute specifically referred to the former President by name still did] not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder
Clause.244
Despite the facts that Mr. Nixon "constituted a legitimate class of
one," and that "the focus of the enactment [could] be fairly and rationally understood" as to preserve the documents of his presidency24 5 the
Court upheld the statute compelling him to turn over his papers. To
conclude this point, the Court added that:
Moreover, even if the specificity element were deemed to be satisfied
here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would not automatically be implicated. Forbidden legislative punishment is not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome consequences. Rather, we must
inquire further whether Congress... 'inflict[ed] punishment'
within
246
the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
After cataloging the historically more notorious forms of punishment
and finding that the former President could claim none of them had been
244. Id. at 470-72 (footnotes, quotations and citations omitted). The Nixon court added:
[Tihe fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punishment.
Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive
for such deprivation.
Id at 470 n.32.
245. Id at 472.
246. Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted).
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worked upon him,2 47 the Court applied its more functional test to determine whether the so-called punishment "further[ed] nonpunitive legislative purposes ....
Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not
appear," one can safely conclude that the law violates the Bill of Attainder Clause's prohibition against meting out punishment to specified
individuals.2 4 8
In the dispute involving Mr. Nixon, no such impermissible purpose
was present. The Court found that the statute served legitimate nonpunitive legislative goals, including the preservation of Mr. Nixon's records
for historical purposes.24 9 Justice Brennan found that the motivation behind the law was not one of punishment: Indeed, the legislative record
evinced no such intent. Mr. Nixon therefore could not sustain his bill of
250
attainder claim.
The defendants in Anixter now find themselves in a position similar
to Mr. Nixon's. Their argument, however, is even more attenuated because the new limitary statute does nothing, facially or otherwise, to punish. Moreover, any so-called "classification" that section 27A might
amorphously create is far less intrusive than the one complained of by
the former President. Moreover, even in Nixon, the Supreme Court
found that the "intrusion" was not constitutionally offensive. To claim
that section 27A violates the Bill of Attainder Clause is quite simply

illogical.
E. A History Without a Lesson
Another practice of courts that have declared section 27A unconstitutional is to rely heavily on the statute's so-called legislative history.
This reliance is misplaced, as it is clear that the legislative reports which
accompanied the bill omitted any discussion whatsoever of the new law.
This leaves the sporadic floor debates of the Congress, as memorialized in
the Congressional Record, as the only organized compilation of the legislative history of section 27A. Brichard, for one, supported its finding
that section 27A is unconstitutional by alleging that the very words of
the lawmakers clearly indicated that the law's purpose was to usurp the
powers of the judicial branch.
The course steered by Brichard and its like is perilous indeed. The
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

473-75.
475-76 (citations ommitted).
476-78.
478.
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Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for
finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill,
which 'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.' "25 Chief Justice Rehnquist himself previously opined that the
High Court "eschew[s] reliance on... passing comments" and "casual
statements" made on the floor of Congress by its members.2 52 In the
view of the Chief Justice, such remarks do not make for "impressive legislative history, '25 3 and it is unlikely that such comments could carry the
day in a further adjudication. Thus, the courts that have lined up against
section 27A on this ground have improperly and erroneously relied upon
suspect legislative commentary.
F. Beam: More Good Than Harm to Section 27A
Another flawed proposition raised against section 27A is that the
statute must fail because of the allegedly "constitutional rule" of Beam.
In particular, the opinion of the district court in Brichardpointed to legislative encroachment, summarily rejecting the argument that Beam was,
in truth, a choice of law disposition.
To suggest that Beam is anything more than a choice of law case is
simply to ignore the text of the opinion itself, which states explicitly it is
exactly that-a choice of law decision. The conclusion of Justice Souter's plurality opinion declares:
The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are confined
entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the Court has applied a rule
of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect
254to all
others not barred by procedural requirements or resjudicata.
This analysis leads one to conclude that Beam is not a landmark case of
constitutional proportions. Certainly, the Tenth Circuit had no quarrel
with the High Court's characterization of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in
Anixter.z " Circuit Judge Moore quoted Justice Souter's language from
Beam to find unequivocally that the Supreme Court's holding "grounded
the question of retroactivity 'entirely to an issue of choice of law.' "256
251. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186
(1969)).
252. Id.

253. Id at 78 (quoting Zuber, 396 U.S. at 187).
254. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2448 (emphasis added).
255. 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991).
256. Id. at 899 (quoting Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2448). See Brown v. The Hutton Group, [1991 1992 Transfer Binder] See. Reg. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,626, at 92,929 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1992). In
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On this basis, Beam offers no solace to the opponents of section 27A.
Moreover, notwithstanding the criticisms of Beam as stated here
and elsewhere, Beam may actually prove that section 27A is constitutional. For example, the common thread within the opinions decrying
the new limitary statute as an unwarranted intrusion by the Congress
into the domain of the judiciary is that the courts have interpreted Beam
to demand the retroactive application of the limitations period enumerated in Lampf. If so, it follows that the passage of section 27A was the
proper exercise of Congress' constitutional power to amend or repeal
law. Additionally, just such an exercise of legislative prerogative was
advocated by Justice Stevens' dissent in Lampf. Justice Stevens asserted
that the revision of limitary periods is "a lawmaking task that should
properly be performed by Congress." 2'57 Demonstrating great foresight,
the Justice commented that "[w]hen the Court ventures into this lawmaking arena,... it inevitably raises questions concerning the retroactivity of its new rule that are difficult and arguably inconsistent with the
neutral, non-policy making role of the judge. ' 258 By enacting section
27A, Congress did exactly what Justice Stevens implored. Is it not true,
after all, that the Supreme Court, upon careful examination of the existing federal securities acts, interpreted those statutory bodies to impose
a one-year/three-year statute of limitations upon section 10(b) actions?
Continuing in this vein, was the supposed mandate of Beam to apply
Lampf retroactively not the same type of judicial interpretation, made
pursuant to some statutory scheme? Admittedly, Lampf was interstitial
lawmaking by the Court. But the point remains-is the legislative
branch still not empowered to change the law by statutory amendment or
repeal? It is asserted here that Congress constitutionally did so when it
promulgated section 27A.
G. Retroactivity Denied: Lampf II
Finally, there is most certainly no clear sign that if confronted with
the issue, the Supreme Court would hold that Lampf's limitary period
must be applied retroactively. As the author has addressed this point at
length elsewhere,25 9 that discussion will not be repeated here, save for the
that case, District Judge Conner strongly disagreed with the Court's finding that § 27A was unconstitutional, and wrote that only three Justices of nine predicated the Beam analysis on constitutional
grounds. Id.
257. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 2784 (citations omitted).
259. Sabino, supra note 3, at 516, 527-52.
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following critical points.
First, Lampf obtusely applied its own new rule to the litigants before
the Court. The justification for this application by itself is never made
clear, let alone a full declaration that the new limitary period was intended to be enforced retroactively. 6
Second, the companion case of Beam, which supposedly championed unfettered retroactivity, is, in short, a disjointed opinion ultimately
resulting in the application of a pre-existing limitary rule, not a true exercise of unencumbered retroactivity.2 61 Putting aside the discordant notes
struck by Beam, which themselves add to the air of uncertainty, Lampf
is bereft of any indicia that the High Court would explicitly advocate a
retroactive application of the one-year/three-year rule to pre-Lampf
cases. Indeed, Lampf leads to exactly the opposite conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, one must seriously contemplate the vigorous dissent hurled by Justice O'Connor at Lampf's application of its own
new rule to the parties before the court in that controversy. Justice
O'Connor remonstrated that:
This Court has, on several occasions, announced new statutes of limitations. Until today, however, the Court had never applied a new limitations period retroactively to the very case in which it announced the
new rule so as to bar an action that was timely under binding Circuit
precedent. Our practice has been instead to evaluate the case at hand
by the old limitations period, reserving the new rule for application in
future cases.2 62
This principle, Justice O'Connor pointed out, is based on "fundamental
notions of justified reliance and due process," implemented to ensure a
party its day in court. 2 6 3 Detailing why the Court went awry in failing to
apply that doctrine here, Justice O'Connor opined:
First, in adopting a federal statute of limitations, the Court overrules
clearly established Circuit precedent; the Court admits as much. Second, the Court explains that 'the federal interes[t] in predictability' demands a uniform standard. I agree, but surely predictability cannot
favor applying retroactively a limitations period that the respondent
could not possibly have foreseen. Third, the inequitable results are
obvious. After spending four-and-one-half years in court and tens of
thousands of dollars in attorney's fees, respondents' suit is dismissed
for failure to comply with a limitations period that did not exist until
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 542.
Id. at 536-52.
Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
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today.

264

Doubting that the bench's "cursory treatment" was an oversight,
Justice O'Connor criticized the Court for "visiting unprecedented unfairness" on the plaintiffs "for reasons unknown and unexplained in
265
choos[ing] to ignore the issue.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Lampf was not by mere happenstance:
It is firmly grounded in principles long espoused by the Supreme Court
to safeguard the proper retroactive application of new law. Years of precedent issued by the 11igh Court have shown great distaste for the inherent unfairness of retroactivity in statutes of limitations cases.2 66 The

litmus test for retroactive application of a new law was postulated in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,2 67 where the Court was asked to determine
whether its own decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,268
which adopted state law instead of federal common law as the basis for
computing the limitations period for claims under the Lands Act, should
be applied retroactively or only prospectively. In Chevron, the Court
elected not to apply the new rule retroactively when to do so would have
barred the plaintiff's claim.
The Chevron Court cited three factors to consider in deciding
whether to choose prospective application:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been
stressed that we must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by
looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for where a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis
in our cases for 269
avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of
nonretroaCtivity.
Adhering to Chevron, the Court recently "reaffirmed the commonsense rule that decisions specifying the applicable statute of limitations
264. Id. at 2787 (citations omitted).
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 2787-88.
Saint Francis College v. Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1987).
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
395 U.S. 352 (1969).
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (quotations and citations omitted).
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apply only prospectively."'2 7 In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.
Smith, Justice O'Connor stated that the nonretroactivity doctrine demands consideration of the equities and gives "great weight to the reliance interests" of all parties affected. 27 1 "[H]arsh and disruptive effect[s]
on those who relied on prior law" compel prospective application.27 2
Justice O'Connor concluded that,
if the operative conduct or events occurred before the law-changing
decision, a court should apply the law prevailing at the time of the
conduct. If the operative conduct or events occurred after the decision, so that any reliance on27old
precedent would be unjustified, a court
3
should apply the new law.
The plurality reaffirmed the principles embodied in Chevron2 74 and rejected the dissent's suggestion that the Court overrule Chevron.275
Even in the American Trucking dissent, continued support for Chevron and its progeny came to the fore. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, recognized
that the Court has "declined to give 'retroactive effect' to decisions announcing 'new' rules of law." 27 6 Those cases typically arise from statute
of limitations controversies,277 "an area over which the federal courts
historically have asserted equitable discretion," which implicitly includes
the power to refuse to apply a law retroactively.27 8 Chevron, St. Francis
College, and others establish "a principle particular to the exercise of
[that] equitable discretion."2 79
Thus, the retroactive application of the new limitary period in
Lampf is markedly out of step with the Court's mainstream holdings.
As Justice O'Connor noted in Lampf:
Chevron Oil and Saint FrancisCollege are based on fundamental notions of justified reliance and due process. They reflect a straightforward application of an earlier line of cases holding that it violates due
270. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2787 (citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 199200 (1990)) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Kennedy, J.).
271. American Trucking Ass'ns, 496 U.S. at 185. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Franklin, 789
F. Supp. 1313, 1319 (D.NJ. 1992) (Brotman, J.) (refusing to apply Lampf retroactively to other
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities code in light of American Trucking "because of the

inequity" that would result to the plaintiffs).
272. American Trucking Ass'ns, 496 U.S. at 191.
273. Id

274. Id at 199.
275. Id at 189.

276. Id at 209 (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
277. Id
278. Id at 221 (emphasis added).
279. Id at 222.
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process to apply a limitations period retroactively and thereby deprive
a party arbitrarily of a right to be heard in court. Not surprisingly,

then, the Court's decision in Chevron Oil and SaintFrancisCollege not
to apply new limitations periods retroactively generated no disagreement among members of the Court: the opinion in Chevron Oil was
joined by all but one Justice, who did not reach the
retroactivity ques28 0
tion; [and] Saint Francis College was unanimous.

Given the critical reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in
Lampf, one who wagers that the Justices would continue to propound a
retroactive application of Lampf in light of these landmark holdings, especially after the promulgation of section 27A, takes an enormous risk.
The safer bet, and indeed the best choice as a strictly legal matter, is that
the Lampf rule is not destined for continued retrofitting to the section
10(b) cases that preceded it. Rather, section 27A would most likely be
upheld by the Supreme Court, not only because it is a constitutionally
permissible exercise of legislative power, but because it resolves the concerns over Lampf's retroactivity that the high Court articulated but did
not resolve at that time.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing analysis reveals, the arena of federal securities litigation has been once again cast into the shadow of uncertainty. No
sooner than the Supreme Court settled the simple, yet divisive, question
of the appropriate limitary period to be applied to section 10(b) securities
fraud actions, the retroactivity issue the court left unresolved has reared
its head, spurring a legislative reaction. And because the lawmakers arguably did not address the entire spectrum of considerations raised by
Lampf when they enacted section 27A, the trial courts are forced into
striking discord over the new statute's constitutionality.
The constitutional rationales raised by the district courts in opposition to section 27A are not to be dismissed lightly. Nevertheless, they
presume too much in contending that Congress invaded the sacrosanct
separation of powers and violated the constitutional doctrines of equal
protection and prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.
Other courts have viewed the issue quite differently: They counter
that Congress is simply doing what it has done constitutionally for over
two centuries-when displeased with a judicial interpretation of a statute
280. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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(or, as here, with interstitial lawmaking in lieu of a statute), the
lawmakers amend the statute to bring it into line with what Congress
intended but may not have articulated clearly enough in the past. The
dogmas of constitutional jurisprudence discussed in this article have not
been invaded, offended, or otherwise troubled by the enactment of section 27A.
Moreover, the cases overturning section 27A make a prodigiousand dangerous-assumption: That the Supreme Court would continue
to apply Lampf retroactively. The glaring disharmony of opinion on this
issue in both Lampf and Beam cuts heavily against that presumption.
Rather, the more likely result is that courts reviewing section 27A will
follow Chevron, find the statute constitutional, and refuse to apply Lampf
retroactively. One takes a significant risk in suggesting that section 27A
is unconstitutional because the Court intended Lampf to be applied
retroactively.
Both the Supreme Court and Congress must share the blame here
for the current crisis-the Justices for not making clear their intentions
for the new limitary period, and the lawmakers for leaving the statute of
limitations issue half unresolved. All the signs indicate that the latter
will reopen debate on the entire section 10(b) limitations issue in future
sessions. Indeed, the instant controversy leaves Congress with no option
but to delve back into a debate on all aspects of the section 10(b) limitations issue. One can only hope that Congress will comprehensively rework the law to reflect its true intentions and eliminate the need for
additional litigation to resolve the questions of the proper limitation period for section 10(b) actions.
Just as likely, many of the district and appellate decisions discussed
in this article will find their way to the Supreme Court. A High Court
decision declaring section 27A constitutional is not probable, but is nonetheless welcome. In the interim, high hopes abound for the wisdom of
the Tenth Circuit in Anixter. Yet if that case is not to be dispositive, then
let Lampf II resolve all questions and close this agonizing chapter of
federal securities litigation once and for all by restoring justice to those
who relied upon pre-Lampf limitary periods, while at the same time ensuring a fair application of the new uniform statute of limitations to subsequent cases.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss1/2

44

Sabino: A Statutory Beacon or a Relighted Lampf: The Constitutional Crisi

1992]

THE NEW SECTION 27.4
AFTERWORD

In the early fall of 1992 and since the completion of this article, the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have declared section 27A constitutional for
precisely the reasons discussed in the article. After oral argument on the
rehearing of Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,' the Tenth Circuit
followed Roberton v. Seattle Audubon Society 2 and held that section 27A
does not impermissibly attempt to direct the judgments of courts in specified cases. Rather, decided the court, section 27A constitutes a change
in the law. Soon thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit reached the same result
in Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta.3 These ciruit level decisions are consistent with recent holdings of other federal courts that section 27A is the
product of legitimate exercise of Congress' power to change the law.'
The author fervently hopes that the decisions in Anixter and Henderson
will put to rest the controversy over the constitutionality of section 27A.
Anthony Michael Sabino
1. 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991), cert granted andjudgment vacated sub nom, DennIer v.
Trippett, 112 S. Ct. 1658, amended by 112 S. Ct. 1757, affld, Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 61
U.S.L.W. 2139 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992).
2. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992), followed by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 61 U.S.L.W. 2139
(10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992).
3. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
4. Kalmanson v. McLaughlin, No. 86 Civ. 9366, 1992 WL 190139 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1992);
Rabin v. Fivzar Assoc., No. 90 Civ. 4869, 1992 WL 192056 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1992); Lundy v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Cortes v. Gratkowski, 795 F. Supp. 248
(N.D. Ill. 1992); Maio v. Advance Filtration Sys., 795 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1992). See also
McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992). Contra Treiber v. Katz, 769 F. Supp. 1054
(E.D. Mich. 1992).
Additionally, although the Second Circuit has not yet expressly followed Anixter and Henderson, it has implied strongly that it will do so if confronted with a constitutional challenge to section
27A. Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992).
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